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Undoing Historical Wrongs: Law and
Indigeneity in India
POOJA PARMAR *
Beginning with a close look at a recent call by the Supreme Court of India to undo the historical
injustices done to the "original inhabitants" of the country, this paper examines similar calls
for justice made by Jaipal Singh Munda, the most vocal representative of Adivasis in the Constituent
Assembly of India between December 1946 and January 1950, when both the possibilities
and limitations of addressing past injustices were being written into the Constitution of India.
While drawing attention to debates and disagreements over righting certain past wrongs
that remain largely absent from historical accounts of the Constitution's drafting, this paper
also invites reflection on the probLematique of addressing calls for reparation made by
dispossessed peoples as original inhabitants in modern liberal democracies.
D6butant par une 6tude d~taill6e d'un jugement r~cent de La Cour Supreme de linde
cherchant 6 redresser les injustices historiques faites aux aborigines du pays, cet article
examine de semblables recours en justice intent6s par Jaipa. Singh Munda, repr6sentant le
plus 6loquent des Adivasis 6 'Assembl6e constituante de linde de d6cembre 1946 6 janvier
1950, 6poque o6 Ion a ench~ss6 dans [a Constitution de linde tant [a possibilit6 de rem6dier
aux injustices du pass6 que Les entraves en d6coutant. Tout en attirant ['attention sur Les
d~bats et Les discordes relatifs au redressement de certains torts du pass6 qu'escamotent
largement les comptes rendus historiques de [a r6daction de [a Constitution, ['article invite
6 r6fl6chir sur La probl6matique des demandes judiciaires de r6parations intent6es dans Les
d6mocraties lib6rates modernes par les premi6res nations 6 titre de peuples d6poss6d6s.
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OFTEN AS NATIONS ARE IMAGINED and re-imagined, previously unrecognized
histories are remembered, wrongs are named and recounted, and nations and
peoples are called upon to acknowledge and address past injustices. India and
Canada, with their distinctly layered and contested pasts yet shared colonial legacy,
are no exception. Each country continues to encounter and struggle with many
such calls for undoing past wrongs. In this paper, I focus on calls for reparation
made by or for dispossessed and displaced peoples as original inhabitants of
India. I begin with a closer look at a recent call by the Supreme Court of India to
undo past injustices done to the peoples it refers to as the most likely original
inhabitants of the subcontinent.1 The Court describes these peoples variously
as tribal people, Adivasis, Aborigines, and Scheduled Tribes.2 Noting both the
promise and the limits of this call for justice from the highest court in the
country, I turn to similar calls made during the framing of the Constitution of
India (Constitution),3 in particular, those made byJaipal Singh Munda, a member
of the Constituent Assembly and a tireless advocate of Adivasi rights. I do so with
the aim of inviting further reflection on the problematique of addressing certain
historical wrongs in modern liberal democracies.'
While the focus of this paper is on the legal response to claims for remedying
particular past wrongs in India, the underlying insights arise from my continuing
efforts to understand the nature of the relationship between Aboriginal claimants
and the state, both in India and Canada. While reading about confrontations
between Aboriginal protestors and Canadian authorities at Oka and Caledonia,
my thoughts often turned to Muthanga in Kerala.' Just as conversations about
1. Kailas & Ors v State ofMaharashtra, [2011 ] 1 SCR 94 (India) at paras 17, 24, 34 [Kailas].
2. Ibid at paras 4, 26.
3. India Const, 1950 [India Const].
4. For an examination of the "perplexities of righting old wrongs," including the limitations
of contemporary legal and institutional frameworks in dealing with the complex issues of
identifying victims and perpetrators, determining appropriate remedies, and dealing with
the layered quality of old wrongs, see Marc Galanter, "Righting Old Wrongs" in Martha
Minow & Nancy L Rosenblum, eds, Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law, and Repair
(Princeton: Princeton University Press: 2002) 107.
5. The Oka and Caledonia conflicts in Canada in 1990 and 2006, respectively, drew attention
to the unsettled land disputes between First Nations and the Government of Canada
when members of First Nations communities occupied disputed lands in protest of certain
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residential schools during my research in Kerala reminded me of stories shared at
academic conferences in Canada, dreams of a better future for Indigenous peoples
in Canada bring to mind similar aspirations expressed in a different language
in India. Even as constitutional recognitions and remedies differ, political and
legal decisions in both countries have often deployed similar rationales towards
similar outcomes.
Though indicative of commonalities, these observations also point to vital
differences between the two countries-one a country of old and one a country
of new immigrations. 6 A comparative history of these two nations, with distinct
yet somewhat similar pasts and presents, is likely to offer new ways of understanding
contemporary dilemmas; however, the conversations that would make that possible
have only just begun.' 'What I offer here, therefore, is not a comparative analysis
but instead a reflection on critical moments in India's engagement with, and
attempts to right, certain past wrongs through law. I offer this reflection from
an in-between place, as I write in one place about the other, trying to dwell in
and on both, with the hope of adding another dimension to the transnational
conversations in this volume.
I. TIME TO UNDOA PAST
On 5 January 2011, the Supreme Court of India dismissed a criminal appeal,
concluding its judgment with a call to address historical wrongs done to the
nation's tribal peoples. "It is time now," the Court noted, "to undo the historical
injustice" done to these peoples.' One of these people is Nandabai, a woman who
belongs to the constitutionally recognized Bhil tribe. In 1994, three men and
one woman-all "powerful persons" in her village-stripped, beat, and kicked
a pregnant Nandabai in her house.' The four assailants then forced Nandabai
government decisions. In January 2003, several Adivasi families entered the Muthanga range
of the Wayanad Wildlife Sanctuary in Kerala in an act of protest against the breach of an
earlier agreement by the state government and denied entry into the area to non-Adivasis and
state officials for over a month. The forcible eviction of the occupants resulted in the death of
at least two people (a policeman and an Adivasi man) and injuries to several.
6. See Kailas, supra note 1 at para 20.
7. See Gyanendra Pandey, "Introduction: TIhe subaltern as subaltern citizen" in Gyanendra
Pandey, ed, Subaltern Citizens and their Histories: Investigations from India and the USA
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2010) 1 at 1 (suggesting that "a new kind of comparative history"
would be "one in which we deal not in universals already understood, but in the assumptions
that underlie our individual histories-and thence our 'universals').
8. Kailas, supra note I at para 39.
9. Ibid at paras 7, 15.
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to walk naked through the streets of her village. Throughout this parade they
continued to beat and abuse her because they wanted her to end what the Court
described as her "illicit relations" with Vikram, a "higher caste" man who was the
father of her daughter and unborn child) While it is not apparent whether anyone
in the village intervened at the time of the assault, the judgment notes that the
eyewitnesses "turned hostile" during the course of the trial, due either to "fear [of
the accused] or some inducement."'1 The convictions were based on the medical
report, evidence gathered by the local police during investigations, Nandabai's
statements, and Vikram's corroborating evidence, in spite of the fact that "he did not
support the actual incident."'2 The accused appealed their convictions to the High
Court of Bombay with limited success before being heard by the Supreme Court. 3
One of the arguments advanced by the appellants was that members of "the
Bhil community live in torn clothes as they do not have proper clothes to wear,"
by which they meant to suggest that publicly stripping a woman who belongs to
such a community was not as serious a crime as similar treatment of a woman
from a different community would have been.14 It is not clear from the judgment
whether this argument was also part of their defence at trial, but it is obvious
that the appellants perceived it as a mitigating factor, at least in their appeal to
the Supreme Court. This "mentality" of regarding "tribal people as inferior or
sub-humans," the Court noted, is "totally unacceptable in modern India."". In
dismissing the appeal, the Court observed that the gravity of the offence called
for a harsher punishment than what the appellants had been given at trial and
that the appellants' partial success before the High Court on "hyper technical
grounds" was regrettable. 6
Going beyond the facts of the specific crimes committed against Nandabai,
the Court situated her experience and the legal response to it within a broader social
and historical context. At the very outset of the judgment, the Court framed the
case as "a typical instance" of the manner in which many Indians treat those who
are "probably the descendants of the original inhabitants of India."' 7 These Adivasis
(translated as "original inhabitants"), the Court noted, make up about 8 per cent of
10. Ibid at para 7.
11. Ibid at para 14.
12. Ibid at para 12.
13. Ibidat para 6.
14. Ibid at para 16.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibidat para 10.
17. Ibidat para 4.
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India's population.18 They are among the country's "most marginalized and vul-
nerable communities," with the everyday realities of their lives marked by a "high
level of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, disease, and landlessness."'1 9
In order to single out the injustices done to Adivasis as "a shameful chapter"
in India's past, the Court relied on historical accounts of the persecution of
Bhils, especially in the seventeenth century, when entire communities were either
"wiped out" or forced to the "hills and forests" to escape the "oppressions and
atrocities" committed by "other communities.""i It called for a change in mentality
towards these peoples, who have been "victimized for thousands of years."2" As
the original inhabitants of India, the Court noted, "they must be given the respect
they deserve."22
In recalling this history, the Court understood Nandabai's ordeal as a continuation
of past injustices. For Nandabai, a decision from the highest court in the country
might have brought some closure to an ordeal that had begun over sixteen years
earlier. Insofar as the decision centres past wrongs in the present pursuit of
meaningful justice, it is a welcome decision; furthermore, it considers not only
the particular crime, but also the history and the social conditions that made it
possible. The decision is also significant for its recognition, however cautious,
of a history that remains largely unacknowledged in India. However, even
as it calls for more respect for the descendants of those it considers to be
the probable original inhabitants of the country, this decision does not depart
enough from similar attempts at undoing past wrongs to bring about the change
that the Court undoubtedly desires. Herein lies the challenge of righting past
wrongs in a modern liberal democracy where legal institutions engage with layered
and contested histories.23
II. HISTORYAND LAW
Having framed Nandabai's experience in the context of the past injustices
suffered by her community, the Court devoted several paragraphs of its
judgment to considering evidence in support of the proposition that "India is
18. Ibid. The 2001 census records the population of Scheduled Tribes at a little over 84.3
million.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibidat paras 17-18, 36.
21. Ibidat para 34.
22. Ibid.
23. For an overview of the challenges faced by legal institutions, see Galanter, supra note 4.
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broadly a country of immigrants. 2L It noted, however, that unlike the United
States and Canada, both of which are countries of "new immigrants," India "is
a country of old immigrants." 25 Roughly 92 per cent of people in India are
descendants of immigrants. 6 In order to arrive at this conclusion, the Court
relied on multiple sources of historical knowledge, including The Cambridge
History ofIndia, an Urdu couplet, the Mahabharata (a major Sanskrit epic regarded
by many as a source of history of the subcontinent), academic scholarship, and a
Google search. 7 The Court was not, however, oblivious to the fact that the past
that it invoked remains contested. The particular account of immigration offered
by the judgment contains an implicit acknowledgement of the disputes over the
veracity of this history. This caveat is most notable in the judgment's repeated use
of "probably" in association with "original inhabitants."
Even as scholarly debates over the applicability and relevance of the term
"Indigenous peoples" in India continue, 28 the position of the permanent Indian
delegation at the United Nations is that no "category of people in India can be
singled out" as Indigenous peoples. 9 The terms Adivasi and Scheduled Tribes,
which the Court uses interchangeably, also have their own distinct origins and,
in their invocation, tell different stories. Scheduled Tribes refer to "tribes or tribal
communities" that are explicitly identified for the purposes of implementing the
country's affirmative action programs in a periodically revised schedule of the
24. Kailas, supra note 1 at para 19.
25. Ibidat para 20.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibidat paras 18, 23-25.
28. Scholars cite several reasons for caution in relation to the term, including concerns over a
lack of attention to particular histories of the region that include the complex history of
migrations into and within the subcontinent, as well as concerns over distinguishing with
certainty tribes from other castes and communities classified by the colonial administration.
Other reasons for caution include the long history of interactions and cultural exchange, a
questioning of colonial knowledge production, and the perceived imposition of a Western
concept of "Indigenous peoples." See generally Bengt G Karlsson & TB Subba, eds,
Indigeneity in India (London: Kegan Paul, 2006); Sumit Guha, Environment and Ethnicity
in India, 1200-1991 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Irfan Habib, "The
Formation of India: Notes on the History of an Idea" (1997) 25 Social Scientist 3; Virginius
Xaxa, "Transformation of Tribes in India: Terms of Discourse," Economic & Political Weekly
34:24 (12 June 1999) 1519. For more nuanced histories of the relations between Adivasis
and non-Adivasis in particular regions of India, see Ajay Skaria, Hybrid Histories: Forests,
Frontiers and Wildness in Western India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); Nandini
Sundar, Subalterns and Sovereigns: An Anthropological History of Bastar, 1854-2006, 2d ed
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007).
29. Bengt G Karlsson, "Anthropology and the 'Indigenous Slot': Claims to and Debates about
Indigenous Peoples' Status in India" in Karlsson & Subba, eds, supra note 28 at 56.
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Constitution of India. 30 As indicated later in this article, the term replaced the
word "Aboriginal" in the draft Constitution." Unlike the term "Scheduled Tribe,"
the word "Adivasi" has no legal recognition in India. The word, "a combination
of adi, meaning 'beginning' or 'of earliest times,' and vasi, meaning 'resident of,"'
is generally translated as "original inhabitants."3 2 It is believed to be a "recent
term" that originated in the 1930s in the Chota Nagpur region of Bihar.33
Despite questions about the identity of the original inhabitants of various
regions of the country, the term Adivasi is recognized by some as a "social fact." 14
It is also preferred over other terms by Adivasis themselves and by others who
see in its use the recognition of a particular history of "subjugation during the
nineteenth century of a wide variety of communities which before the colonial
period had remained free, or at least relatively free, from the controls of outside
states."3 Extending beyond the connotations of "autochthonicity" conveyed by
its literal meaning, the articulation of" [b]eing Adivasi" in contemporary India is
also "about shared experiences of the loss of the forests, the alienation of land,
repeated displacements since independence in the name of 'development
projects', and much more."3 So understood, the term also refers to "a distinctive
way of being outside the narratives of the Indian nation state."37 As mentioned
above, the Court in Kailas did not engage with these distinct meanings and
origins of the two terms, instead using them (along with the word "tribal") as
synonyms, as is common in India.
After its foray into history and before reaching its conclusion, the Court returned
to the source of its own authority: the Constitution of India.3" This return
coincided with its turn to the language of "help" and "protection," terms used in
reference to the peoples it describes as Adivasis, Aboriginals, and Scheduled
30. India Const, art 366(25). Various provisions in the Constitution provide the framework for
the country's comprehensive affirmative action (or "compensatory discrimination") policies.
31. See Part VI below, entitled "The 'Backward' Tribes."
32. David Hardiman, The Coming of the Devi: Adivasi Assertion in Western India (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1987) at 13.
33. Ibid.
34. Amita Baviskar, "The Politics of Being 'Indigenous"' in Karlsson & Subba, eds, supra note 28
at 36.
35. Hardiman, supra note 32 at 15.
36. Skaria, supra note 28 at 281.
37. Ibid
38. For reflections on the relationship of the Supreme Court of India to the country's
Constitution, see 0 Chinnappa Reddy, 7he Court and the Constitution of India: Summits and
Shallows (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008); Pran Chopra, ed, 7be Supreme Court
Versus the Constitution: A Challenge to Federalism (New Delhi: Sage, 2006).
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Tribes. 9 The Court noted that the Indian Constitution, which guarantees equality
and freedom to all citizens, does not stop at formal equality. Rather, it makes
extensive provisions for extending "special protection and help" to "historically
disadvantaged groups" so that they may be "uplifted from their poverty and low
social status."4 1 Since Adivasis are the most marginalized peoples in the country,
"living in terrible poverty with high rates of illiteracy, disease, [and] early mortality,"
the Court recognized that they must be accorded all possible help."1
The Court's turn to the language of help and protection was inevitable,
because it is as people who need to be uplifted and protected that the Adivasis are
promised justice in the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution acknowledged
existing inequalities that were the result of past injustices. This recognition forms
the basis of the special provisions for members of the Scheduled Tribes (along
with similar ones for the Scheduled Castes) in the Constitution."2 These provisions
were aimed at undoing certain past wrongs by providing the legal basis for what
are at times referred to as the country's affirmative action policies. The Constitution does
not, however, recognize either Adivasis or Scheduled Tribes as original inhabitants;
indeed, such recognition was not extended to any of those claiming such status.4 3
As citizens, therefore, Adivasis cannot make a claim for justice as original inhabitants.
Any claims must necessarily arise from their need for special protection and help.
The existence of constitutional protections-as well as other statutory
protections and affirmative action policies-has not, however, brought about the
shift in mentality that the Court in Kailas acknowledged is necessary if things
are going to change in any meaningful way."4 The Court attempted, therefore, to
marshal morality, ethics, benevolence, and nationalism in the interest of justice to
those members of the nation who have been wronged in the past. It declared:
"[1] t is the duty of all people who love our country to see that no harm is done
to the Scheduled Tribes."4" In so doing the Court returned, as it must, to the
39. Kailas, supra note 1 at para 34.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. See India Const, arts 15(4)-(5), 16(4), 16(4A), 17, 46, 244(A), 330, 332, 335, 338(A), 339,
Schedule V, Schedule VI.
43. The Hindu Right claims that only Hindus-not Muslims or Christians-are India's original
inhabitants. Members of Scheduled Castes, or dalits, also claim to be original inhabitants,'
tracing their past to the Dravidians, who were subjugated by Aryan invaders said to be the
ancestors of Hindu upper-castes. See e.g. Baviskar, supra note 34; Andr6 B&eille, "What
Should we mean by 'Indigenous Peoples'?" in Karlsson & Subba, eds, supra note 28 at 19.
44. See especially India Const, art 46; India Const, Part XVI; The Scheduled Castes and The
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention ofAtrocities) Act, 1989, No 33 of 1989, India Code.
45. Kilas, supra note 1 at para 34.
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language of help and protection even as it attempted to escape such language
through references to the "superior ... character" and "higher level of ethics" of
Adivasis as compared to non-Adivasis.4 1
The Court concluded with a declaration: "It is time now to undo the historical
injustice [done] to them."4 1 This almost-anguished call for justice for Adivasis
comes at a time when the debates over their continuing dispossession and
displacement have re-emerged in India, triggered largely by the ongoing violence
in parts of central India that are home to several Adivasi communities and have
become valuable to others because of their considerable forest cover and substantial
mineral reserves. Although a deeper analysis of the Court's jurisprudence on
issues concerning Adivasis is needed, in at least two previous decisions the Court
has held that the "displacement of the tribals" does not in itself violate their
"fundamental or other rights" and has accepted the government of Kerala's
contention that Scheduled Tribes do not have any constitutional or common law
rights to the restoration of lands already alienated.4 8 The Court in Kailas, however,
recognized the injustice in these past displacements. The ruling is significant for
this reason, despite the fact that the case did not involve a land dispute. Yet
while Kailas made a strong case for respecting India's original inhabitants, it
also revealed the impossibility of finding a legal basis for the change the Court
desired for Adivasis. The decision is inherently limited in its potential application
because of the confines of the very foundation of India's formal legal system:
its Constitution.
In order to explain this proposition more fully, I now turn to a time when both
the promise for addressing old wrongs and the limitations of such a project were
written into the Constitution as it was being framed, when the "soul of a nation,
long suppressed, [found] utterance." 9 The calls made during the debates of the
Constituent Assembly of India by Jaipal Singh Munda, an Adivasi leader, for
righting old wrongs, as well as his complex relationship with the process through
which the foundations of the legal system of the postcolonial nation were laid,
offer insights for a better understanding of the dilemma that underlies the promise
and limits of a decision such as Kailas.
46. Ibidat para 39.
47. Ibid.
48. See Narmada Bachao Andolan v Union of India, 2000 AIR SC 3751 at 3787; State of Kerala
6-Anr v Peoples Union for Civil Liberties, Kerala State Unit & Ors, [2009] 11 SCR 142
(India) [PUCL].
49. Debates of the Constituent Assembly ofIndia, vol V (14 August 1947) at 4 (Jawaharlal Nehru)
[Debates].
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III. JAIPAL SINGH MUNDA
Over six decades ago, not far from the place where the Kais decision was delivered,
Jaipal Singh Munda, the most vocal representative of A'ivasis in the Constituent
Assembly, made repeated calls for respect and justice for India's original
inhabitants. Like the Court in Kailas, he too saw the existing mentalities and the
treatment of Adivasis as unacceptable in a new India. Singh tried unsuccessfully
to locate a basis for undoing some of those past wrongs in the Constitution as it
was being written.
Very little has been written about Singh, and even less about his insistence on
bringing an uncomfortable history into the Assembly at every possible chance.
However, some details of Singh's early life emerged after the publication of his
autobiography in 2004, thirty-four years after his death."0 The manuscript itself
came to light after it was handed to a visiting researcher by an Oxford professor. It
is not clear how or when the professor acquired the manuscript, or why it was not
revealed for so long, but according to Singh's son, his father wrote it as he sailed
to England in 1969, the year before his death."' This autobiographical account,
noted for its "bubbly sense of humour" and its "matter-of-fact" tenor, is also said
to reflect the author's "sharp mind and intellect, a rebellious spirit, humility and
a zest for life."52
Born Pramod Pahan, Singh acquired a new name and date of birth in 1911,
on the day his father enrolled him in the St. Paul's School in Ranchi. Singh
describes his family as "rich," albeit "[a]ccording to Adivasi reckoning."53 The
highlights of his childhood appear to be the nightlong melas-or gatherings-
and the annual community hunts where the elders "met in council to judge
outstanding village disputes" while the younger members of the community
barbecued the gains of the hunt.5 At St. Paul's School, Singh met Canon
Cosgrave, the man to whom Singh considered himself most indebted. Cosgrave,
who had spent his own money building St. Paul's, as well as a separate school for
50. Jaipal Singh, Lo Bir Sendra: An Autobiography, ed by Rashmi Katyanan (Ranchi: Prabhat
Khabar, 2004).
51. "Ring in the new with Jaipal jottings: Oxford don gifts the icon's unpublished autobiography
to the people of state," The Telegraph (1 January 2004), online: <http://www.telegraphindia.
com/1040101/asp/jharkhand/story_2738226.asp>.
52. Ibid.
53. "Pramod Pahan is christened Jaipal Singh - Excerpts from unpublished autobiography of
the national icon," The Telegraph (3 January 2004), online: <http://www.telegraphindia.
com/i 040103/asp/ranchi/story_2747500.asp>.
54. Ibid.
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girls, was also the chaplain of St. Paul's Cathedral. In his autobiography, Singh
reminisces that, against his mother's "innermost feeling," he "developed a leaning
for the Canon's religion" over time, and was baptized by him."5
When Cosgrave returned to England, he took Singh with him, overriding
the bishop's concerns that this would "spoil" Singh. 6 Subsequently, Singh attended
St. Augustine's College in Canterbury for two terms. He then joined St. John's
College at Oxford, from which he graduated in 1926 with honours in economics."7
It was at Oxford that he began his exceptional career in field hockey, a sport with
which he would remain connected for the rest of his life.58 From being "the star
full-back of Oxford," Singh went on to captain the Indian field hockey team at
the Amsterdam Olympics in 1928.Y' He did not, however, play in the crucial final
match that won the team the gold medal. While the reasons for Singh's absence
remain a mystery, his teammate and Indian hockey legend, Dhyan Chand,
indicated some conflict at the management level, as well as unconfirmed stories
about "communal and racial issues" as possible reasons."
When Singh was offered the captaincy of the Indian Olympic hockey team,
he was working in Oxford as a "probationer for the Indian Civil Service." 61 He
took up the position in defiance of the India Office, which had turned down
his request for a leave of absence.61 Upon his return, Singh resigned from the
Indian Civil Service, a decision he describes as "stupid" in his autobiography.
63
Thereafter, he became the first Indian to be appointed as a "covenanted mercantile
assistant" by the Royal Dutch-Shell Group and began work in its Calcutta office.
64
55. Ibid.
56. "The Boy from Khunti Travels to England - Excerpts from the unpublished autobiography
of a national icon," The Telegraph (5 January 2004), online: <http://www.telegraphindia.
com/ 1040105/asp/jamshedpur/story_2753173.asp>.
57. Ronojoy Sen, "Divided loyalty: Jaipal Singh and his many journeys" (2009) 12 Sport in Soc'y
765 at 765.
58. For details of his personal achievements in field hockey, as well as his leadership in
encouraging "Indian students from Oxford, Cambridge, London, Edinburgh and
Manchester" in the sport, see ibid at 766.
59. Dhyan Chand, Goal! (Chennai: Sport & Pastime, 1952) at 11, online: <http://www.
bharatiyahockey.org/granthalaya/goal/>.
60. Ibid.
61. Sen, supra note 57 at 767.
62. Ibid.
63. "Jaipal Singh joins Burmah Shell - Excerpts from the unpublished autobiography of
a national icon," The Telegraph (6 January 2004), online: <http://www.telegraphindia.
com/ 1040106/asplranchi/story_2755627.asp>.
64. Sen, supra note 57 at 768. In Calcutta, Singh married Tara Majumdar, the granddaughter of
WC Bannerjee, the first president of the Indian National Congress.
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On his second day at work, Singh was summoned by the branch manager and
reminded to not use the "Baboos' lift" in the building.65
From Calcutta, Singh moved to British West Africa, where he took up a position
as the "senior house master of the junior and unnamed house" at the Prince
of Wales College at Achimota.6 1 He was appointed to his post by the principal
of the college, despite objections from the "colonial office. '67 After a successful
stint there, Singh returned to India as the principal of the Rajkumar College
in Raipur.5 Later, he worked for some time in the then-independent State
of Bikaner before returning home. 9 In his autobiography, Singh mentions a
subsequent employment-related meeting in Patna with Doctor Rajendra Prasad,
who would later serve as the chairman of the Constituent Assembly and, thereafter,
as the first president of India. The interview, Singh notes without providing too
many details, "ended [his] propensity for the Congress [Party].""
Around this time, his longtime associate, Maurice G. Hallet, then the governor
of Bihar, offered to nominate Singh to the Bihar legislative assembly, an offer
that Singh declined." Later, in early 1939, Singh accepted the leadership of
the newly formed Adivasi Sabha (Adivasi Assembly), which he renamed as the
Adivasi Mahasabha (Adivasi Grand Assembly)." The organization was regarded
as "anti-Congress" at the time, and various Congress Party members expressed
doubt over Singh's ability to last as its leader.7 3 Singh notes in his autobiography
that this doubt was because a man "used to comfort" was not expected to be able
to "work in the jungle."' 4
65. Ibid. Baboo is a title of respect in some Indian languages, like the English mister. The baboos
and sahebs that Singh encountered in that elevator wore "sola topees," or pith helmets, usually
worn by the Europeans in India at the time.
66. "Journey to the 'unmentionable'- Excerpts from the recently-published autobiography
of a national icon," The Telegraph (7 January 2004), online: <http://www.telegraphindia.
com/ 1040107/asp/jharkhand/story_2757382.asp>.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Sen, supra note 57 at 768.
70. "Around the world and return to Ranchi for the native son," The Telegraph (9 January 2004),
online: <http://www.telegraphindia.com/1040109/asp/ranchi/story-2767202.asp>. While
Jaipal remained a strong critic of the Congress for a long time, he formed an alliance with the
Congress Party in the 1960s. His son has described this much-criticized move as a personal
and political failure that Singh "had to live with." For a very brief summary of the events that
led to this alliance, and to Singh's subsequent disappointment with Nehru for not creating a
separate Adivasi state, see Sen, supra note 57 at 771-72.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
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Singh's many journeys had indeed taken him far from his home in significant
ways. His education and economic status set him apart from the everyday realities
of the people he wished to represent. His commitment was suspect because he
was no longer 'backward,' the characteristic that defines a tribal person for many,
even today. As comments made during debates in the Constituent Assembly
reveal, this was a charge he encountered more than once. In an Assembly where
many others were similarly distanced from the lives and struggles of the people
they claimed to represent, it was Singh who encountered suggestions that a man
who lived and dressed like him could not claim to speak on behalf of Adivasis.75
But by then Singh was prepared to meet that charge. He had spent considerable
time travelling and speaking with Adivasis across India. 6 In response to a charge
that he did not know "anything about the tribals outside ... his own province,""7
Singh pointed out:
I go about quietly, moving about among my own folk, and I try to understand them
and I do not come to hasty conclusions. I have for the last eleven years tried my
best to educate non-tribal people to appreciate the self-respect, the imponderables
of Adibasi culture.
7 8
The man referred to by Adivasis of his region as marang gomke (translated
most often as supreme chief or leader), and the significant role that he played
in highlighting the concerns of Adivasis and their demands for justice across
India, appear to have been largely ignored by legal researchers. Despite all that
his presence in the Assembly, his speeches and silences, and his claims and
disagreements offer for understanding the possibilities and limits of justice for
Adivasis as original inhabitants, Singh remains absent from the history of the
Indian Constitution." Even the works specifically focused on constitutional
provisions for Scheduled Tribes offer only a passing reference, if any, to Singh as
the man whose proposals were rejected.80 The little attention that he has received
75. See e.g. Debates, supra note 49, vol IX (5 September 1949) at 993, 995 (Jaipal Singh).
76. See ibid, vol 1 (21 December 1946) at 159.
77. Ibid, vol IX (5 September 1947) at 987 (AV Thakkar).
78. Ibid, vol IX (5 September 1949) at 990 Uaipal Singh). "Adibasi" is synonymous with Adivasi.
The difference in spelling simply indicates a different pronunciation.
79. While scholarship on the Indian Constitution from which Singh remains absent is too
voluminous to list, it is worth noting that several portions of the debate on the Fifth
Schedule of the Constitution held on 5 September 1949 are inexplicably missing from the
records of the Debates available on the website of the Parliament of India. Anyone relying
only on an online search of the database is therefore likely to never find many of Singh's
speeches or the responses of other members.
80. See e.g. B Shiva Rao, 7he Framing oflndia's Constitution: A Study (Nasik: Government of
India Press, 1968); GS Ghurye, The Scheduled Tribes, 3d ed (Bombay: Popular Press, 1963).
504 [2012149 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
is limited to his role in the Jharkhand movement that culminated in the formation
of a separate State of Jharkhand in 2000.81
Just as Singh's interesting life and "many journeys"82 await a biographer, the
ways in which his leadership shaped political mobilization around Adivasi identity
in independent India await further research and more serious engagement. While
my account here is based specifically on his calls for reparation on behalf
of Adivasis in the Constituent Assembly between December 1946 and January
1950, there is no doubt that a fuller account of the trajectory of his political
career and the decisions he made outside the Assembly before, after, and during
the debates would offer a more comprehensive understanding of the role that he
played as a leader of Adivasis in India.
IV. AN ADIVASI IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA
On 11 December 1946, the chairman of the Constituent Assembly introduced
Singh as the representative of the "aboriginal tribes of Chhota Nagpur."83 Singh,
a member of the Munda tribe of the region, considered himself the representative
of the thirty million original inhabitants of India, a point he emphasized over
and over again during the debates.84 Even his insistence on using the word
"Adibasi" over all others indicates the centrality of the histories of dispossession
in his claims for justice.8" While not the only one, Singh was the most vocal
advocate of Adivasi interests in the Assembly. Most significantly, he remained
dissatisfied by the Assembly's approach to what was repeatedly referred to
For a brief but notable exception, see Sundar, supra note 28 at 186-87.
81. The demand for a separate State of Jharkhand was based on the Adivasi Sabha's desire for
preserving and promoting Adivasi language, culture, and customary law, and for making
their lands inalienable. See Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World's
Largest Democracy (London: Macmillan, 2007) at 266; KL Sharma, "Jharkhand Movement
in Bihar" Economic and Political Weekly 11: 1-2 (10 January 1976) 37.
82. For a brief introduction to some of these journeys, see Sen, supra note 57 at 765.
83. Debates, supra note 49, vol I (11 December 1946) at 46 (Sachchidananda Sinha).
84. See e.g. ibid, vol I (19 December 1946) at 46, 143 (Jaipal Singh); vol 11 (24 January 1947) at
337 (ibid); vol 1II (30 April 1947) at 462-463 (ibid); vol IV (22 July 1947) at 751 (ibid).
85. See ibid, vol IX (5 September 1949) at 992-93 (Jaipal Singh). Singh strongly opposed the
use of the word "vanjati" (forest tribes), which he described as an "old abusive epithet" due
to its connotations of barbarity and wildness at the time. While that word was discarded in
the Hindi translation of the Constitution, Singh was equally opposed to other suggestions of
"adimjati" or ' anajati." According to him, Adivasi was the most appropriate word, as it had
been used for long and was understood by all Adivasis. In his words: "I am an Adibasi, I call
myself an Adibasi. I cannot understand why you wish to give us another name."
PARMAR. UNDOING HISTORICAL WRONGS 505
as the "tribal question."8" He was critical, at times even suspicious, of the
commitments to undoing past wrongs professed repeatedly in the Assembly.
And yet he was enthusiastic about the hopes of a future free from colonial rule,
willing to put his faith in the new India that was being imagined and shaped.
One fact that Singh emphasized the very first time he spoke in the Assembly,
and that he repeated throughout the debates, was that the dispossession of Adivasis
did not begin with the arrival of the British, nor would it end with their departure.
Singh pointed out that "for the real rehabilitation and resettlement of the original
people of India," it was necessary not only that the British quit, but that others who
had exploited and dispossessed Adivasis for thousands of years do so as well.87
He elaborated on this in his next long and impassioned speech in response to a
resolution introduced by Jawaharlal Nehru laying out "an outline of the plan" for
the nation.88
In asking all "intruders" to "quit,"8 9 Singh was not, however, foreclosing the
possibility of working together. Singh appears to have held at the time a genuine
belief that it was possible for Adivasis and non-Adivasis to work together for
a more just future in the new India. An early indication of this belief was his
decision to open up the membership of the Adivasi Mahasabha to non-Adivasis.9
His many utterances during the debates indicate that he held on to this belief
for a long time, despite his many differences and disagreements throughout the
framing of the Constitution. The following extract from his speech, delivered in
response to Nehru's resolution regarding the aims and objects mentioned above,
is instructive in understanding the significance under Singh's approach of both
remembering the past and building bridges for the future:
Mr. Chairman, Sir, I rise to speak on behalf of millions of unknown hordes-yet
very important-of unrecognised warriors of freedom, the original people of India
who have variously been known as backward tribes, primitive tribes, criminal tribes
and everything else, Sir, I am proud to be a Jungli, that is the name by which we are
known in my part of the country. Living as we do in the jungles, we know what it
means to support this Resolution. ... The whole history of my people is one of
continuous exploitation and dispossession by the non-aboriginals of India punctuated
by rebellions and disorder, and yet I take Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru at his word. I
86. Ibid, vol 11 (24 January 1947) at 338 (Jaipal Singh). The 'tribal question' or the 'question of
tribes' was at the time framed mainly as an issue of whether the tribes should be assimilated
or isolated. Eg Sundar, supra note 28 at 156-90.
87. Debates, supra note 49, vol I (11 December 1946) at 46-47 (Jaipal Singh).
88. Ibid, vol 1 (19 December 1946) at 143-44 (Jaipal Singh). For the Resolution and Nehru's
speech, see ibid, vol 1 (14 August 1947) at 57-65.
89. Ibid, vol I (11 December 1946) at 47 (Jaipal Singh); vol I (19 December 1946) at 143 (ibid).
90. Sharma, supra note 81 at 41.
506 12012) 49 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
take you all at your word that now we are going to start a new chapter, a new chapter
of Independent India where there is equality of opportunity, where no one would
be neglected ...
I have heard of resolutions and speeches galore assuring Adibasis of a fair deal. If
history had to teach me anything at all, I should distrust this Resolution, but I do
not. Now we are on a new road. Now we have simply got to learn to trust each other.
... I am convinced that not only the Mover of this Resolution, Pandit Jawahar Lal
Nehru, but every one here will deal with us justly.
It is only by dealing justly, and not by a proclamation of empty words, that we will
be able to shape a constitution which will mean real freedom.
91
This attempt to reconcile past injustices and the suspicions they created with
dreams of a different future being imagined by many at the time, underlies much
that Singh said in the Assembly. At every stage, he aired his fears of being
deceived, of inadequate Adivasi representation in decision making in the Assembly
as well as outside of it, and of moves and proposals that amounted to nothing
more than "political window-dressing."92 Like his compatriots, he was living at a
time when many old wounds were being recalled and named. As another member
of the Assembly, Professor N.G. Ranga, pointed out during the third reading of
the draft Constitution, in "an ancient country" like India there is inevitably "a lot
of debris of the past which has got to be cleared."93 This time of doubt and conflict
was also, however, a time for hope in new beginnings. In this difficult time, Singh
chose to follow what he refers to as the "common sense" of his people; it was this
common sense that led him to believe that every one of them had to "march in
that road of freedom and fight together."9'4 With these words, he supported Nehru's
resolution, not because, as he made sure to point out, it had been moved by "a
leader of the Indian National Congress," but rather for the reason that it gave
"expression to sentiments that throb[bed] in every heart in [the] country.""
V. PEOPLES AND NATIONS
Singh's first speech in the Assembly was received with what the record identifies as
"cheers," and his second impassioned- presentation of the hopes of Adivasis ended
with "applause."96 This reception did not, however, make his task any easier. As
91. Debates, supra note 49, vol 1 (19 December 1946) at 143-45 (Jaipal Singh).
92. Ibid at 144.
93. Ibid, vol XI (17 November 1949) at 627 (NG Ranga).
94. Ibid, vol 1 (19 December 1946) at 143 Uaipal Singh).
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid, vol I (11 December 1946) at 47; vol I (19 December 1946) at 145 (ibid).
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the Assembly moved on from its initial euphoria to the hard work of finalizing
each sub-clause and proviso over three readings of a long Constitution containing
hundreds of articles, Singh repeatedly found his ideas-fundamental for ensuring
justice for Adivasis in his view-opposed, ignored, and even ridiculed by many.
The words "freedom" and "democracy" were repeated innumerable times
during the debates. In an Assembly of few women and many men (a fact pointed
out by Singh more than once) with various ideological leanings representing
different parts of a diverse country, these two words inevitably held different meanings
for different individuals and groups.97 For Adivasis, freedom from British rule was
"only a stage," a significant milestone, but by no means the end of the journey.98
As Singh pointed out to the Assembly, now that the British administration could
not be blamed for the policies adopted in the country, everyone in that Assembly
was "on trial" and had to behave differently.9 "Real freedom," according to him,
required a lot more than the departure of the colonial rulers.' Not only did the
non-Adivasis have to acknowledge the treatment that had been meted out to the
original inhabitants of the country by all outsiders whether British or not, they also
had to make an effort to understand what needed to be done to undo "the injuries
of six thousand years."'01
Reminding the Assembly of the history recounted in Nehru's book 7he Discovery
of India, Singh indicated what the Adivasis expected of the new nation. Freedom
for them would mean nothing short of a return of the tribal republics that had
existed. "[T] here will again be many tribal republics," he said, adding that these
republics would "be in the vanguard of the battle for Indian freedom."" 2 This is
how the concepts of democracy and freedom would make sense for him. While
neither of these two concepts, he pointed out repeatedly, were new for his people,
this is how they had to work together in the new India being imagined at the time
if they were to hold meaning for the Adivasis. His calls for a fair and equitable
deal for Adivasis in the postcolonial nation seemed to have been predicated on his
faith in the Assembly and, despite his mistrust of the Congress, on the faith that
he placed in Nehru's leadership at the time.'03
97. See ibid, vol I (19 December 1946) at 144; vol I (24 January 1947) at 338 (ibid).
98. Ibid, vol I (11 December 1946) at 46 (Jaipal Singh).
99. Ibid, vol 11 (24 January 1947) at 338.
100. Ibid, vol 1 (19 December 1946) at 145.
101. Ibid, vol 11 (24 January 1947) at 337.
102. Ibid, vol 1 (19 December 1946) at 145. Here Singh was invoking Nehru's reference to
autonomous "tribal republics" that "in all probability" existed along with small kingdoms and
states in "ancient India." See Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (New York: John Day
Company, 1946) at 88-89.
103. See Debates, supra note 49, vol I (19 December 1946) at 144-45; vol 11 (24 January 1947) at
508 (20121 49 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Singh's vision for the Adivasis' future in India-in particular, the nature
of their relationship with the nation-state--emerges clearly from the speech
he delivered in response to the resolution proposed by Nehru regarding India's
national flag. Speaking on behalf of "the real owners" and the "most ancient
aristocracy of India," Singh said:
On behalf of these my people, I have great pleasure in acknowledging this Flag as the
Flag of our country in future. Sir, most of the members of this House are inclined
to think that flag hoisting is the privilege of the Aryan civilised. Sir, the Adibasis
had been the first to hoist flags and to fight for their flags. ... [Y]ear after year, in the
melas, jatras and festivals in Chota Nagpur, whenever various tribes with their flags
enter the arena, each tribe must come intojatra by a definite route by only one route
and no other tribe may enter the mela by the same route. Each village has its own
flag and that flag cannot be copied by any other tribe. If any one dared challenge
that flag, Sir, I can assure you that that particular tribe would shed its last drop of
blood in defending the honour of that flag. Hereafter, there will be two Flags, one Flag
which has been here for the past six thousand years, and the other will be this National
Flag which is the symbol of our freedom as Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has put it. This
National Flag will give a new message to the Adibasis of India that their struggle for
freedom for the last six thousand years is at last over, that they will now be as free as
any other in this country. I have great pleasure, Sir, in accepting and acknowledging
on behalf of the Adibasis of India the Flag that has been presented to us by Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru. 
10
4
In addition to foregrounding the dispossession of Adivasis and reconstructing their
rich past, this passage is a clear indication of Singh's vision for what he had
described earlier as tribal republics. The original inhabitants would be a part
of the nation-state, but without giving up their autonomy. Even as he made
it clear that any challenge to the traditional flag of each tribe was unac-
ceptable, he also accepted the national flag for its "new message. ' It was a
"symbol of freedom" for the Adivasis as well, albeit of a freedom that they
had .been struggling to achieve for much longer than the rest of the peoples of
the nation." 6
In speaking about freedom, Singh was not talking about separation."0 ' Rather,
he appears to have offered the Assembly a chance to imagine the nation differently.
By freedom, he meant autonomy in decision making and a relationship based on
337 (ibid).
104. Ibid, vol IV (22 July 1947) at 751 (Jaipal Singh) [emphasis added].
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid
107. This is reflected in much of what Singh said during the Debates. See e.g. ibid, vol IV (30 July
1947) at 947; Ramachandra Guha, supra note 81 at 275.
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respect and reciprocity-words and themes that recur in his speeches. 08 In
critical ways, Singh's understanding is analogous to the Indigenous understanding
of the two wampum belts presented by William Johnson, a representative of the British
Crown, to Aboriginal representatives at the Niagara Conference in 1764.19 The
belts represented the promise of "interaction and separation" and a "political
relationship that incorporates autonomy and integration" to those who received
them.1 ° They had accepted them in hope of a future where they would "travel the
river together, side by side, but in [their] own boat."1 ' In a different place and time,
Singh had hoped to find a similar promise for the future.
Singh extended his understanding of autonomy not only to relations between
Adivasis and the nation-state, but also to relations between different tribes. As
indicated in the passage quoted above, even as Singh spoke on behalf of all Adivasis,
he was always mindful of respecting the autonomy of each individual tribe.
According to him, it would have indeed been ideal if each tribe could speak for
itself. During a discussion concerning the membership of a proposed advisory
committee for the Assembly, Singh regretted the fact that it was not possible
to include a representative of every one of the 177 tribes listed in the census of
1941.112 He considered the absences problematic given the advisory committee's
mandate to resolve the so-called tribal question.
However, Singh's proposals, which emphasized tribal autonomy as a means
for ensuring an equitable deal for his people, were largely ignored in the Assembly.
Responding to Singh's "vigorous criticism" of what he perceived as inadequate
representation, Govind Ballabh Pant noted that Singh "was chafing and the
vehemence of his utterances seemed to [Pant] to compensate for the poverty of
[Singh's] ideas."1 3 Instead of responding directly to the issue, Pant chose to state
his belief that the tribes had "not received that attention and active service ... to
which they were entitled." He then added: "I think we owe them a duty and we
should do all we can to raise their general level."11
108. Singh repeatedly called for respect for Adivasi ways of life, languages, and practices. For
his views on Adivasi languages, see Debates, supra note 49, vol IX (14 September 1949) at
1439-41.
109. John Borrows, Recovering Canada: 7he Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2002) at 125-27.
110. Ibid at 126-27.
111. Ibidat 126.
112. Debates, supra note 49, vol 11 (24 January 1947) at 338 (Jaipal Singh). In fact, he also urged
the Assembly to seriously consider the fact that no tribal woman had been nominated to this
important committee.
113. Ibidat 346 (Govind Ballabh Pant).
114. Ibid.
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Not one to be discouraged by such a response, Singh continued to raise
questions about more representation not only for Adivasis, but also for others
who he thought would challenge the majority opinion. As he bluntly pointed
out on the very next day while commenting on the composition of a committee
appointed to examine and advise the Assembly on the assignation of subjects to
the central and state governments, "Looking at the list, it seems to me that the
plan is not for unity but for uniformity."'1 What Singh expected for his people
was equal participation in all decision making; in his view, it was the totality of
the vision for the nation that was going to determine the future of Adivasis. The
tribal question could not be considered in isolation of the plans for the nation-state
being shaped in that Assembly. Unfortunately, as became clearer to him over the
course of the debates, this was not a vision shared by most others.
This radical difference in approach emerged clearly during a debate on
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. These justiciable rights,
representative of the liberal underpinnings of the Constitution, comprise the most
important rights guaranteed to citizens.116 One of them was envisaged at the time
as the right of every citizen to reside and settle in any part of the "Union," to
"acquire property and to follow any occupation, trade, business or profession."'17
This right was meant to remove caste-based restrictions with regard to occupations.
Despite the fact that a proposed proviso to the draft language permitted
"reasonable restrictions" on the right as considered necessary "in the public interest
including the protection of minority groups and tribes," '1 8 a fundamental right of
every citizen to acquire land anywhere in the country was a cause for considerable
concern among tribes.
Singh wanted any discussion on the draft language to be deferred until after
the reports of the two tribal sub-committees had been considered.'"9 He was most
emphatic in pointing out that such a provision that was "vital to the Adibasi
millions" could not be discussed without taking account of the recommendations
115. Ibid, vol 11 (25 January 1947) at 357 (Jaipal Singh).
116. See India Const, Part III. It is worth noting that liberalism is a significant ideology, but not
the only one that finds representation in the Constitution. The Directive Principles of State
Policy in Part IV of the Constitution were informed by socialist and other ideas. These, unlike
the Fundamental Rights set out in Part III of the Constitution, are aspirational in nature and
non-justiciable.
117. Debates, supra note 49, ;vol III (30 April 1947) at 457 (Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel).
118. Ibidat 458.
119. Ibid at 462 (Jaipal Singh). Two separate sub-committees for Tribal and Excluded and Partially
Excluded Areas in Assam and outside of Assam had been appointed by the Assembly.
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of the sub-committees.12 Given the centrality of the issue of past and ongoing
dispossession for Adivas, he felt it would be "unwise, inexpedient and premature'
to consider such a provision then.'21 He repeated what he had said before:
"[L]and is and must be the bulwark of aboriginal life." '122 The provision
under consideration, he said, was "going to mean the life or death" not only of
those Adivasis who lived in designated tribal areas, but also of the "many more
millions living outside these tracts."'23 He insisted that it be made unequivocally
clear that certain protections under existing colonial laws that prohibited transfer
of Adivasi lands would not be discontinued. 21 In fact, he reported that members
of various tribes with whom the sub-committee-of which he was a member-
had met while preparing its report had urged them to ensure "that for several
years to come, the aboriginals' land must be inalienable."'25 The reasons for his
concern become apparent from the fact that this demand-fundamental to the
Adivasis' conception of freedom and justice-was disregarded and even ridiculed
by other members in the Assembly.
Nehru neither disregarded nor ridiculed this demand for inalienability, but
his response to Singh exhibits a complete failure, shared by many in the Assembly,
to acknowledge the centrality of dispossession and displacement to the tribal
question. Protection against further dispossession from lands traditionally used
and occupied by Adivasis was fundamental to them. To Nehru, however, even
though the issue raised by Singh was valid, he did "not see what it has to do with
fundamental right[s]."126 The issue of Adivasi lands would be considered separately,
he pointed out, but "thinking of this [issue] in terms of a fundamental right
would be ... entirely wrong."'27 Nehru admitted that he did not know about
the existing legislation relating to the alienation of tribal lands at the time, but
that did not lead him to doubt the correctness of his opinion. He was certainly
not unsympathetic towards the plight of tribes.'28 In fact, he assured the "people
120. Ibid at 462.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid at 463.
123. Ibid at 462.
124. Ibid at 463.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid at 466 (Jawaharlal Nehru).
127. Ibid
128. For Nehru's middle-path approach to Aboriginal issues in India, see Jawaharlal Nehru, "The
Tribal Folk" in The Tribal People ofIndia (New Delhi: Government of IndiaPress, 1973) 1;
Verrier Elwin, "Do We Really Want to Keep Them in a Zoo" in The TribalPeople of India
(ibid) 8. For the five principles enunciated by Nehru, see SC Dube, "Development Designs
and Tribal People" in SC Dube, ed, Antiquity to Modernity in Tribal India: Continuity and
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interested in tribal areas" that the sympathies of "the whole of India" were with
them.129 Like him, there were others who also spoke in support of special provisions
for the protection of the people Nehru referred to as their "backward" and
"unfortunate brethren." 3 ' But their sympathy did not translate into recognizing
what the Adivasis considered fundamental to undoing past wrongs and justice in
the future. The predominant view was that though the Adivasis could certainly
be protected by constitutional recognition of their status as "backward peoples,"
that recognition would not include a fundamental right not to be alienated from
the lands they lived on.
VI. THE "BACKWARD" TRIBES
The "backward" peoples-or classes-of India featured prominently in several
discussions and disagreements during the debates. The description was applied
to various groups: religious minorities in specific regions, Hindu lower-castes,
and Adivasis. Much was said about bringing such people up to the level of the
rest of Indians. But, unlike the other groups, the definition of the tribes limited
their identity to one of "backwardness." In several framers' view, to be a tribal
person meant to be living in a state of social, cultural, and economic primitiveness,
and once a person shed that status one also shed one's tribal identity. Thus,
while a Muslim would not cease to be a Muslim once she was deemed not
backward and a member of any specific caste would not cease to belong to that
caste once her 'level' was raised, a member of a tribe was tribal only as long as
she was 'primitive.' Anyone who did not meet that criterion would simply cease
to be an Adivasi.'
The backwardness of tribes was seen as a barrier to the formation of the
modern nation that had to be overcome.132 Speaking during the debates, Vallabhbhai
ChangeAmong Indian Tribes, vol 1 (New Delhi: Inter-India, 1998) 1 at 11-12. For a critique
of Nehru's approach, see Nandita Haksar, "Law and the Self-Management of Tribal Societies
in North-East India" in Bhupinder Singh, ed, Antiquity to Modernity in Tribal India: Tribal
Self-Management in North-East India, vol 2 (New Delhi: Inter-India, 1998) 161.
129. Debates, supra note 49, vol III (30 April 1947) at 466 Uawaharlal Nehru).
130. Ibid.
131. This was expressed in various ways over the course of the debates. See e.g. ibid, vol IX (5
September 1949) at 983-84. For a brief historical review and critique of this categorization,
see Xaxa, supra note 28 at 1519 (arguing that this is a result of the tendency to view
"tribes not as communities in their own right but in terms of affinity or non-affinity with
mainstream communities").
132. See Skaria, supra note 28 at xii (noting that "[tlhe wildness of the tribe epitomized Indian
backwardness; this backwardness had to be overcome for the nation to become modern, or
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Patel suggested that the very word "tribes" would become redundant as soon
as the tribal people "have come up to our level."'33 Many others echoed this
sentiment over the course of the debates. 'The tribes must be uplifted, civilized,
developed, and assimilated as fast as possible, stated some concerned members
to whom the very existence of "backward tracts" was a matter of shame for the
nation.134 One member declared that the Scheduled Tribes' "sub-human state
of existence" was "a stigma on our nation just as the existence of untouchability
is a stigma on the Hindu religion."'35 They had to be developed and made
"indistinguishable from the rest of the Indian population."'36
Although the word "backward" was often used along with "tribe" during the
debates, this association in both language and law was not born in the Assembly.
It was a colonial legacy that made its way into the debates, and subsequently the
Constitution, via the administrative policies and laws of the departing colonial
regime. In the late eighteenth century, the colonial government in British India
began to delineate areas occupied by particular "primitive" tribes as special legal
and administrative zones. This action was taken to control the rebellions that
erupted continually in many of these areas after immigrants began to settle on
traditional tribal lands following the establishment of British rule.' 37 Taking
advantage of the system of revenue under the "new reign of law," the newcomers,
often traders and moneylenders, began to take over lands that had previously been
occupied by tribes. 38 To maintain order, many of these areas were withdrawn
from the purview of general laws. Ordinary courts ceased to have jurisdiction over
them, even as local customary mechanisms of dispute resolution were codified.'
In many of these areas, the rights of tribes to lands occupied by them were given
special protection under a system of "direct paternalistic government."''14  Over
time, many of these areas came to be known as "backward tract[s]," inhabited by
simply for the nation to become").
133. Debates, supra note 49, vol III (30 April 1947) at 467 (Vallabhbhai Patel).
134. See ibid, vol IX (5 September 1949) at 979-80, 984, 994.
135. Ibid at 979 (Shibban Lal Saksena).
136. Ibid.
137. These legal changes began under the rule of the English East India Company and continued
after the take-over of the administration by the British Crown. See Report of the Indian
Statutory Commission: Volume I - Survey, vol 1 (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office,
1930) at 70 [Indian Statutory Commission: Volume 1 - Survey].
138. Ibid.
139. See Ghurye, supra note 80 at 70-72. For the effects of the codification of local custom in
some parts of India, see Sundar, supra note 28 at 156-90.
140. Prathama Bannerjee, "Culture/politics: The curious double-bind of the Indian Adivasi" in
Pandey, ed, supra note 7, 125 at 126.
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"backward races"-that is, people who were considered primitive, simple, and
unsophisticated."' These people were considered in need of special "protection"
so that they could be educated and enabled to "stand on their own feet."142
At various times,' depending on the specific legal regime in place, some of
these delineated zones were classified as Agency Areas, others as Scheduled Districts.
Subsequently, these backward tracts were renamed as "Excluded Areas" or "Partially
Excluded Areas" by the Indian Statutory Commission, which considered constitutionally
mandated political reforms in British India in 1930.141 The degree of these zones'
exclusion from political reforms proposed by the Commission depended on their
estimated "degree of backwardness."14 4 The reason for their exclusion from
representative politics was their backwardness based on their level of development
and need for protection. 4 Even as the Commission considered political reforms
for the rest of country, it excluded the various backward tracts from such reforms.
According to its report:
They do not ask for self-determination, but for security of land tenure, freedom
in pursuit of their traditional methods of livelihood, and the reasonable exercise
of their ancestral customs. Their contentment does not depend so much on rapid
political advance as on experienced and sympathetic handling, and on protection
from economic subjugation by the neighbours.14 6
Thereafter, the Government of India Act 1935 (significant portions of which
were incorporated into the Constitution) also contained several references to
backward areas and backward tribes.' 7 Finally, these tribal areas came to be
known as Scheduled Areas, and in a move with far-reaching consequences,
Adivasis came to be recognized as Scheduled Tribes in the Constitution. As reported
by Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, chairman of the drafting committee, in response
to Singh's question regarding the substitution of the word "Scheduled" for the
word "Aboriginal" in the draft Constitution, the category of Scheduled Tribes was
141. See Indian Statutory Commission: Volume 1 - Survey, supra note 137 at 62, 158; Report
of the Indian Statutory Commission: Volume It- Recommendations, vol 2 (London: His
Majesty's Stationary Office, 1930) at 108-109 [Indian Statutory Commission: Volume 2
- Recommendations].
142. Ibid, Indian Statutory Commission: Volume 2 - Recommendations at 109.
143. See Indian Statutory Commission: Volume I - Survey, supra note 137.
144. Ibid at 69.
145. For the ways in which these stages of backwardness were determined by anthropologists at
the time, see Verrier Elwin, TheAboriginals (London: Oxford University Press, 1944). Elwin's
classification of Aboriginals in India ranges from "real primitives" and "wilder aboriginals," to
the more modern ones (at 7-10).
146. Indian Statutory Commission: Volume 1 - Survey, supra note 137 at 109.
147. 26 Geo V, c 2 (repealed).
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in fact "invent[ed]."" 8 The tribes enumerated in a specified schedule would be
known as Scheduled Tribes. Ambedkar explained that this was done because the
word Adivasi was "really a general term which has no specific legal dejure [sic]
connotation." 149 In contrast, a "precise definition as to who are these Adibasis" would
enable a court to more clearly determine who could benefit from the privileges
and rights being conferred on the Adivasis by the Constitution.1 5 1 In favouring a
precise definition, the drafters claimed to be emulating the decision to substitute
the word "untouchable" with "Scheduled Caste" in the Government of India Act
1935.151
The fact that the reasons for the change were more complex than the ones
pointed out above is perhaps best illustrated by Ghurye, who believed that Adivasis
were basically "Backward Hindus."15 2 While revising his book, first published in
1943 as The Aborigines-so-called and Their Future, Ghurye changed the title to The
Scheduled Tribes, "following the dictates of [the] Constitution." ' According to him,
since the Constitution spoke of them as Scheduled Tribes, "any other designation [is]
utterly wrong.""5 4 Nonetheless, he welcomed this change, as in his view "terms
like 'Aborigines' or 'Adivasis' are question-begging and pregnant with mischief."'1
The claims of Adivasis as original inhabitants were thus effectively written out of
the Constitution, foreclosing any possibility of a future recognition in the country's
law. While the recurring political and legal demands for recognition as a Scheduled
Tribe byvarious groups in India continue to challenge the legal specificity the drafters
of the Constitution had hoped for, the phrase "Scheduled Tribe" has managed not
only to eclipse a particular history, but also to change the terms of discourse in
India. Since there are no recognized Adivasis, there is no legal basis for any claim
as an original inhabitant. As Scheduled Tribes, on the other hand, many of them
are certainly entitled to "protection" and "help."
The framework of backwardness and protection-underlying both colonial law
and administrative language-was adopted uncritically even by those nationalists
who had viewed the segregation of these areas as yet another self-interested attempt
148. Debates, supra note 49, vol VII. (2 December 1948) at 782 (BRAmbedkar).
149. Ibid. Singh disagreed with the proposition that the word Adivasi was "likely to create any
misconceptions." Ibid, vol IX (5 September 1949) at 993 (Jaipal Singh).
150. Ibid, vol VII (2 December 1948) at 782 (BR Ambedkar).
151. Ibid.
152. Ghurye, supra note 80 at 19.
153. Ibid at ix. Similarly, The Tribal People of India, supra note 128, was first published under the
title "Adivasis" in 1955.
154. Ghurye, supra note 80 at ix.
155. Ibid.
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by the British to keep India divided. While these nationalists had issues with the
colonial government's motives, they did not disagree with the classification of
these areas or its peoples as backward. Backwardness, protection, and development
continue to determine the framework within which policy is formulated and
legal claims on behalf of Scheduled Tribes are adjudicated in India, even today.
Despite the changes in the names by which Adivasis and the places they live in are
known, it is their perceived backwardness that underscores the denial of agency
to them, notwithstanding centuries of law-making.
Singh tried to dislodge this paradigm of backwardness, protection, and welfare
in his own way, albeit without substantial success. Given that these words and
expressions had come to define the very identity of Adivasis, he too was unable
to escape using the same language at times, even while calling for change. The
difference is that he did not use it in the same patronizing way as others."5 6 For
him, most significantly, any perceived lack was not the defining feature of Adivasi
identity. He always spoke of Adivasi traditions, languages, and practices with
pride while repeatedly reminding the Assembly of their dispossession and
impoverishment. His very insistence on the use of the word "Adibasi" throughout
the debates indicates that what set them apart from all others was their claim
of being the original inhabitants of the land. That status was the basis of their
iden'tity and their claim for justice. But they were definitely not "begging [for]
anything," as Singh stated during a debate on reservation of seats in the legislature
for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.5 7
His speech during a debate on minority rights also shows the extent to which
his views were in dissonance with the predominant rhetoric. He acknowledged the
"social, economic and educational" disparities between Adivasis and the "general
population" in India, and advocated strongly for change through legislation.158 But
he distinguished the claims of his people from others with whom they had been
grouped as backward. Singh's language here indicates a conception of sovereignty
and self-governance. He insisted that the original inhabitants and "owners" of the
country could never be considered a minority.19 They had "prescriptive rights"
that could not be denied. 60 Yet they were not asking for those rights, he added,
showing once again his desire to find ways of building bridges. Their demand
156. See Debates, supra note 49, vol IX (24 August 1949) at 654 Uaipal Singh). Singh urged the
members of the Assembly to "not be so condescending."
157. Ibid at 651.
158. Ibid, vol V (27 August 1947) at 209.
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid.
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was to be treated with respect as equals. As his statement during the debate on
reservations indicates, only an "equality of opportunity" that enables Adivasis "to
stand on [their] own legs and regain the lost nerves" would lead to meaningful
justice. 161 Unlike others, however, Singh did not think that they were devoid of
agency. He insisted that Adivasis could "play a part they have a right to play" in
the country, if only they had the freedom to make that choice.16
In Singh's vision, the undoing of past wrongs in the present required something
other than the welfare work envisaged by some other members of the Assembly.163
As one of them suggested, some members of the Assembly had been working for
tribal welfare for a long time, long before Singh began to advocate their cause.1"' In
sharp contrast to Singh's position, these men saw themselves playing the prominent
role in uplifting the Adivasis-which included deciding how best to achieve that
goal. A complete denial of Adivasis' agency is most clearly reflected in the following
statement by a member who appears to be similarly committed to Adivasi welfare:
"We know that the tribes are backward and we know for centuries past they are
backward; but our approach should be not what the tribes would do for themselves,
but what we should do for them."'15 Agitated by Singh's repeated reminders of the
past injustices, he pointed out that "irresponsible statements and baseless allegations"
were unlikely to "advance the cause of the aboriginals."'66
The same fundamental difference in approach between Singh and several
others who spoke on behalf of Adivasis also appears to be the cause of Singh's
disagreement with A.V. Thakkar, highly regarded for his welfare work among
Adivasis. Thakkar was appointed by the Assembly to be the chairman of the
Sub-Committee for Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas (other than Assam).
Singh, who was also a member of this sub-committee, had repeatedly urged
the Assembly to consider its report before arriving at decisions that he had unsuccessfully
argued could not be made without considering the Adivasi perspective. Much to
his disappointment, the report was not discussed in the Assembly due to delays
in its submission. While Singh did not get a chance to explain the reasons for
his disagreement with some of the recommendations made in the report, the
minutes of dissent he submitted, as well as 'Ihakkar's response, indicate that the
two had differences. 167
161. Ibid, vol IV (24 August 1949) at 651,654 .
162. Ibid at 654.
163. See ibid, vol IX (5 September 1949) at 988 (AV Thakkar).
164. Ibid, vol IX (25 August 1949) at 695 (Jadubans Sahay).
165. Ibid at 694 [emphasis added].
166. Ibid at 695.
167. See ibid, vol VII.(4 November 1948) at 182, 189; vol VIII (1 June 1949) at 514-15 (ibid).
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VII.THE FIFTH SCHEDULE
Many of the differences between Singh and his critics over the question of the
Adivasis seem to have come to a head on 5 September 1949 during the few hours
in which the Assembly considered and adopted the proposed Fifth Schedule of
the Constitution. Considering that the Fifth Schedule appears to have failed to
fulfill its intended purpose for exactly the same reasons that Singh considered it
unacceptable, the discussions of the day offer insights into how things could have
been different and why, in fact, they were not.168
The Fifth Schedule, as indicated by its tide, Provisions as to the Administration
and Control of ScheduledAreas and Scheduled Tribes, applies to many areas formerly
classified as Excluded or Partially Excluded, including the areas traditionally and
predominantly inhabited by tribes that were demarcated as special legal and
administrative zones by the British administration.169 Renamed Scheduled Areas,
the Fifth Schedule extended the executive power of the various states within
which they were located to these zones.17 Along with the importation of the idea
of control over peoples and areas, the rationales and sensibilities that informed
the colonial language were also carried over into the Constitution, as indicated by
the debate on the Fifth Schedule.
On a Monday morning, B.R. Ambedkar presented a revised version of the
Fifth Schedule that had been circulated to members of the Assembly on Friday.17 '
While presenting it, Ambedkar stated that it had "the approval of all the parties
who are concerned in this matter."' 7 2 Singh, who was not among those consulted,
proposed five amendments to the proposed schedule.'73 He argued, first, that the
entire schedule be applicable to all members of Scheduled Tribes regardless of
where they resided. Unlike in the previous draft, certain key provisions, insofar
168. For the failures of the Fifth Schedule, see Nandini Sundar, "'Custom' and 'Democracy' in
Jharkhand" Economic and Political Weekly 40:41 (8 October 2005) 4430.
169. Tribal Areas within the former province of Assam are "autonomous districts" governed
by the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, which is not considered in this paper. Due to
treaties and other legal and administrative arrangements between various tribes of this region
and the British administration, the peoples of these areas have always had some degree of
autonomy. The legal and political history of these areas and its tribes, both before and since
the formation of the independent Indian state, is therefore not the same as that of Adivasis in
the rest of India.
170. See India Const, Fifth Schedule, cl 2.
171. Debates, supra note 49, vol IX (5 September 1949) at 981 (BR Ambedkar).
172. Ibid at 967.
173. K.M. Munshi remarked during this debate that Singh had in fact been invited to a meeting,
which he failed to attend. See ibid at 997 (KM Munshi).
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as they related to members of tribes living outside the scheduled areas, had been
left to the discretion of the president or the state governors.17 For the most part,
this change affected the large number of tribes in independent states that had not
been part of British India.
Singh had expressed concerns about tribes in independent states at the very
outset, when he had unsuccessfully demanded that a tribal representative be
included in the committee formed to negotiate with these states. Thereafter,
he had on several occasions brought up the issue of tribes living outside the
Scheduled Areas in British India. Whether the issue of tribal lands was part of
the negotiations with the independent states is not known. What is apparent
from the debates, however, is that Singh's concerns remained unappreciated and
unheeded. The consequences of this are evident in states like Kerala, where the
longstanding demand of Adivasis that the areas where they have traditionally
lived be designated Scheduled Areas has not been met.17 In 2009, claims for
restoration of lands unlawfully taken from them were defeated in the Supreme
Court, partly on the ground that those lands are not within a Scheduled Area
and are therefore not entitled to the constitutional protections available to tribes
in Scheduled Areas.1 76
Singh's other main concern was that the role and position of the Tribes
Advisory Councils (TACs) had been considerably reduced in the proposed new
schedule.' 77 He feared that, if accepted, the Fifth Schedule would effectively reduce
these TACs to non-entities, making them more of a "farce."'178 In opposing these
changes, Singh stated:
I find that this-new proposed Fifth Schedule has, somehow or other, perhaps without
meaning it, emasculated the Tribes Advisory Council. The whole pattern of the
original draft was to bring the Tribes Advisory Council into action. It could initiate,
originate things, but, somehow or other, the tables have now been turned. The
initiative is placed in the hands of the Governor or Ruler of the State.' 79
174. For example, at first it was prescribed that every state where there were scheduled areas or
scheduled tribes must have a Tribes Advisory Council (TAC). This was changed in the new
schedule. According to Ambedkar, it was considered unnecessary to create a TAC "by the
Constitution" in a state where there was no scheduled area, even though there were tribes
living in parts of the state. Under the new schedule, a TAC could be set up in those states if
the president thought it necessary.
175. See Planning Commission, Government of India, Kerala Development Report (New Delhi:
Academic Foundation, 2008) [Kerala Development Report].
176. See PUCL, supra note 48.
177. Debates, supra note 49, vol IX (5 September 1949) at 975-76 (Jaipal Singh).
178. Ibid, vol IX (5 September 1949) at 976.
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He declared that this change was unacceptable to him, and that he "as an Adibasi had and
must have the first claim to be consulted to the proposed change," which had
not been done.18 Another member proposed that the advice of the Councils not
be limited to only the "welfare and advancement" of the tribes, but also include
matters of administration. 8' Reflecting Singh's concerns, this other member
further urged the drafters to ensure that the powers of the TACs not be "limited
by the whims and fancies of the executive authority." 82
While two other members of the Assembly supported Singh's demand for a
stronger role for the TACs, "'83 most other members, whose comments remained
within the confines of the backward/uplift paradigm, did not support this view.
The speech of Brajeshwar Prasad, who began by reading passages from an editorial
criticizing the "reservation of seats for aboriginals in the Federal and State Lower
Houses" because they were "ill-fitted for it by temperament and intellect," is
particularly illustrative of the perspectives of many who claimed to be concerned
with the welfare of Adivasis.8  After reading out excerpts that, among other
things, referred to "aboriginal outbreaks and evidence of reversion to old barbaric
practices" that were causing "disquiet" and called for the "[r]e-examination of
the entire aboriginal problem," Prasad declared that he was "not in favour of the
Tribes Advisory Council."'' 15 In language reminiscent of the report of the Indian
Statutory Commission, he stated that what "the tribals want is not a Council, but
a guarantee by the Constitution that means of livelihood, free education and free
medical facilities shall be provided for all tribals."'86
Some other members spoke about the welfare of tribals along similar lines,
while a few congratulated the drafting committee for the Fifth Schedule, which
was seen as "a new chapter in the history of the elevation of the depressed and
oppressed communities."'87 Thakkar, while speaking in favour of the schedule,
looked forward to the assimilation of tribal people, simultaneously undermining
the issues raised by Singh by suggesting that he did not know anything about the
tribals outside his own province.'88 Singh emphatically denied this charge, but his
180. Ibid.
181. Ibid at 977 (Yudhishthir Mishra).
182. Ibid.
183. See ibid at 977, 986.
184. Ibid at 981-83 (Brajeshwar Prasad).
185. Ibid at 981-82.
186. Ibid, vol IX (5 September 1949) at 982 (Brajeshwar Prasad).
187. Ibidat 989 (Muniswamy Pillay).
188. Ibid at 987 (AV Thakkar).
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earlier confidence appears to have diminished by this time."8 9 It is hard to say to
what extent this change was brought about by the enthusiastic reception of the
amended schedule in the Assembly, the "coldness" with which his amendments
were received, and perhaps his exchange with Thakkar over who could validly
speak on behalf of Adivasis.'95 It appears, however, that it must have become clear
to him that the changes he proposed-both to do away with the distinction
between Scheduled Areas and non-Scheduled Areas for purposes of the application
of the Fifth Schedule and to give a stronger role to the TACs-were not likely
to be accepted. Therefore, in contrast to his initial, vehement opposition to the
amended schedule, he later expressed a hope that the drafting committee would
"incorporate the ideas" he had put forward in his amendments."'
Towards the end of his speech, Singh returned to a dilemma that seems to
underlie many of his speeches in the Assembly, that of living in a time of hope with
memories of a past that make it difficult to believe in a better future. His words
to those who professed to be promoting Adivasi interests indicate his fears clearly:
I would like to emphasise that such friends should bear in mind that unless they
have genuine respect for the people whom they propose to serve, they would not
have earned the right or acquired the capacity to serve. If, however, your mission
of amelioration of the lot of the Adibasis is of the kind that the British professed to
have, coming to India over all this distance of six thousand miles, I would ask you
mercifully to leave us alone, and quit the Adibasi regions.
1 92
He then went on to remind everyone that the "most ancient" peoples, to whom
the country belongs, had yet to take their rightful position in the "national
life" of the country.193 He spoke, yet again, about Adivasis' long struggle for hon-
our and self-respect, underscoring for those who asked the Adivasis to forget the
past a fact he had highlighted at the very outset: Colonialism did not end for his
people with the end of British rule. 9 ' He again emphasized the need for reci-
procity and cooperation and concluded by reassuring the Assembly that Adivasis
would ensure that "the honour of India" is not impaired in any way. 9
Despite Singh's assurances regarding his peoples' commitment to India,
many who failed to see beyond the form of nation that had been imagined in
189. See ibidat 990-92 (Jaipal Singh).
190. See Ghurye, supra note 80 at 384.
191. Debates, supra note 49, vol IX (5 September 1949) at 991 (Jaipal Singh).
192. Ibid at 993.
193. Ibid.
194. For Singh's view on how the biggest problem for Adivasis after Independence was the
replacement of "British imperialism" by "Bihari imperialism," see Guha, supra note 81 at 272.
195. Debates, supra note 49, vol IX (5 September 1949) at 994 (aipal Singh).
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other places understood his position simply as "separatist."' In an appeal to
Singh and his supporters, Biswanath Das pleaded that such distinctions not be
encouraged. He suggested that by establishing the TACs, they were creating a
"racial virus."'9 7 He repeated what others had opined on other occasions: The
scheduled areas had been created by the British to segregate the tribes from the
rest of India for their own interests.198 To Das and others, it was lamentable that
this separation that they had opposed under British rule was not being discarded
in the new India.' 9" Even the word Adivasi, which Singh had hoped would be
used in place of Scheduled Tribe, at least in the Hindi translations of the
Constitution, spoke of separation to some. Disputing the history of dispossession
that Singh had reiterated so often, Das pleaded that the country be "saved" from
the "unfortunate expression 'Adibasis."' 20 0
Another speaker, Brajeshwar Prasad, who had similar concerns over what he
perceived as "disloyalty and ... extra-territorial sympathies" among minorities
at the time, called for a removal of conditions that lead to such disloyalty and
sympathies.211 While not in favour of dispossessing those non-tribals who had
already acquired lands in the Scheduled Areas, he considered a constitutionally
mandated restriction on any further transfer of lands from tribals to non-tribals
to be appropriate, not only "on humanitarian grounds," but more crucially as an
appropriate solution to separatism. 212 "This concession," he observed, "will generate
a feeling of loyalty in the hearts of the tribal peoples." 23
Finally, the most comprehensive rejection of Singh's concerns was presented
by K.M. Munshi, who declared that Singh's position was at odds with that of
the Assembly and the Congress Party with regard to both facts and perspective.
Firstly, he questioned the basis on which Singh could speak on behalf of an
ethnically and linguistically diverse group of tribes, which could not be considered
196. Ibid at 996 (Biswanath Das). See also Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments:
Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).
197. Debates, supra note 49, vol IX (5 September 1949) at 994.
198. Ibid. A British proposal for the reservation of Aboriginal areas in India had, in fact, been
denounced by the Indian National Congress in 1936, right after the enactment of the
Government of India Act of 1935. See Elwin (1944), supra note 145 at 23.
199. Debates, supra note 49, vol IX (5 September 1949) at 985.
200. Ibid at 996 (Biswanath Das).
201. Ibid at 983 (Brajeshwar Prasad). It is worth remembering that these fears owed much to the
violence and suffering that had accompanied the recent partition and formation of Pakistan,
as well as the anxiety over the decision of certain independent States to not join India at the
time.
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as "a single community."2" Rather, Munshi asserted that "[t]he Adibasis are not
one conscious, corporate, collective whole" in such a way "that somebody can
speak in its name or lead a movement combining them into a single unit."25 Such
an approach, he declared, "would be fatal to the tribals themselves.126
The second difference Munshi indicated was that, unlike Singh, others did not
want the tribes to become "little republics."2 7 He suggested that Singh's proposal
with regard to the TACs would have the effect of turning them into "miniature
senates," which he declared to be "an utter absurdity."28 Singh's demand for an
advisory role for the TACs in the administration was similarly "unwarranted."20 9
According to Munshi, since all that the Assembly was concerned with was
"welfare and advancement of the tribals," it was appropriate that the TACs be
consulted for those purposes only.210 Administration, he noted, would include
the appointment of administrative and police personnel and the management of
forests. 211 Having to consult the TACs on all these matters would, according to
Munshi, make it impossible to function. Moreover, Munshi doubted the Adivasis'
abilities to understand complicated administrative issues and did not wish for the
state governors to be bound by advice that may not be correct.212 A requirement
of consultation only as and when considered appropriate by the governors was all
that he believed was necessary.
Ultimately, Singh withdrew one of his amendments, the rest were rejected,
and the Fifth Schedule was added to the Constitution. While Singh's foresight
remains unrecognized, the dangers of which he had alerted the Assembly have
turned out, over time, to be real in many ways. The plight of Adivasis in states
such as Kerala tells its own story of how the members of Scheduled Tribes have
fared in states where their demands for designation of tribal areas as Scheduled
Areas have long been ignored. Even in states with Scheduled Areas, the Fifth
Schedule is largely considered a failure, and the TACs are today the non-entities
that Singh had feared they would be.213
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Jaipal Singh Munda's repeated calls for righting old wrongs in the Constituent
Assembly of India, the responses to those calls, and the disagreements between
him and his fellow drafters arose from fundamental differences in their visions
for the nation and the place of Adivasis in it. Taken together, these interactions
offer valuable insights into both the promise and the limits of undoing certain past
wrongs in a modern democracy. In particular, India's, largely unacknowledged
history indicates that the very terms on which it recognized the original inhabitants
as citizens required any claim prior to, or outside the nation-state, to be discarded.
Some of the ideas and debates set out in this paper, recalling a time when the
possibilities and limitations of addressing past injustices were written into India's
Constitution, offer a way of understanding why the Supreme Court of India's recent
call to undo past injustices represents more an empty promise than any real
possibility for the change that the Court clearly desires.
For Canadian readers, the speeches, silences, hopes, and disappointments
presented in this paper might have a familiar resonance. They are, indeed, not
dissimilar to the experiences of those Canadians whose everyday lives lie somewhere
between the promise of the two-row wampum belts and the limitations of a
modern democratic nation state. In India, the speeches and silences that form
part of the nation's legal foundations-and their connection to contemporary
Adivasi realities-remain largely unacknowledged. Reports by commissions set
up in independent India have repeatedly pointed to the connection between Adivasi
marginalization and impoverishment, on the one hand, and their alienation from
lands and familiar ways of life, on the other. Despite this, Adivasi lands, forests,
and rivers continue to be appropriated for development purposes-industry,
mining, electricity, water, universities-that will not benefit them.2114 Not only
have the central and state governments repeatedly failed to consult with Adivasis
with respect to the relevance and purpose of various- development projects, in
most cases lands are appropriated without informed consent. Left with no recognized
legal basis for opposing their displacement or demanding the restoration of alienated
lands, many Adivasis continue to live the life described by the Supreme Court in
Kailas.215
214. See e.g. ibid; Kerala Development Report, supra note 175; Govinda Chandra Rath, ed, Tribal
Development in India: The Contemporary Debate (New Delhi: Sage, 2006) at 21, 29.
215. See Ministry of Tribal Affairs, "Statistical Profile of Scheduled Tribes in India" (New Delhi:
Government of India, 2010), online: <http://tribal.nic.in/writereaddata/mainlinkFile/
Filel386.pdf>.
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Even as laws are enacted for the betterment of Adivasis, and even as
government-funded "tribal departments" and similarly motivated independent
organizations go about promoting their welfare and the legal system that exists to
"protect" them, Adivasis' lives remain marked by high levels of malnutrition, disease,
illiteracy, and unemployment. The promise and the limitations of language and
law that I have highlighted, both in the Kailas decision and in the debates of the
Constituent Assembly, remain. Meanwhile, the unchanged mentality of the majority
of the Indias people, as noted with regret in Kailas, ensures that Adivasis are still
not considered "uplifted" enough to be allowed to disagree on decisions that
fundamentally affect their lives. Even though political mobilization for Adivasi
rights continues in varied forms, a meaningful engagement with what it means
to be Adivasi, with the relationship of such a claim to the Adivasis' continuing
displacement and lack of autonomy, and with the notions of freedom and mutual
respect-all of which were raised by Jaipal Singh nearly seven decades ago-remains
largely absent.

